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The idea of giving Kim Jong Un a permanent seat on the UN Security Council may sound absurd at first glance. The Council’s structure was never designed for individuals, but rather for the great powers that emerged victorious from the Second World War: the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, and Chinafive countries that still hold absolute veto power in major decisions concerning global security (Financial Times; Wouters & Ruys, 2005). Yet, eight decades later, the global order has changed drastically. New powers have risen in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, but they remain marginalized in the strategic arena. This has sparked criticism that the Security Council suffers from a “global democratic deficit,” where the majority of states have no equal voice in shaping the course of world peace (Le Monde; OxJournal). In this light, the provocative question of granting a seat to Kim Jong Un is not really about North Korea, but about the Council’s relevance in addressing modern geopolitical realities.

One of the biggest obstacles to reform is the veto power. Originally designed to safeguard postwar stability under the assumption that consensus among major powers would ensure collective security, the veto in practice has more often been used to protect narrow national interests rather than the international community as a whole (Fordham International Law Journal, n.d.). As a result, the Council is frequently perceived as slow, ineffective, or even paralyzed in the face of major crises. The war in Ukraine provides a clear example: Russia used its veto to block resolutions condemning its actions, while other permanent members became mired in political deadlock (Journal of International Affairs, 2024). This situation demonstrates not only the inequities of representation within the Security Council but also its weakening credibility as a guarantor of international peace.

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In this context, the extreme idea of a “seat for Kim Jong Un” can be viewed as a provocative metaphor. If the Security Council’s primary goal is to prevent war, is it wise to exclude those most likely to spark conflict? The logic of “keeping your enemies closer” suggests that engaging difficult actors could be a form of risk management: threats are easier to control when brought inside the system rather than left outside it. Yet history also warns that granting legitimacy to authoritarian or aggressive regimes risks normalizing coercive politics, undermining the UN’s credibility, and eroding the fundamental values of peace and human rights (The Guardian; GCSP, 2025). In this sense, such inclusivity could produce not genuine stability but a façade of stabilitywhile simultaneously deepening the crisis of legitimacy.

Looking ahead, the real question is not whether Kim Jong Un deserves or is qualified to hold a permanent seat, but rather how the future of Security Council reform should be designed to make it more relevant, representative, and effective. For nearly eight decades, the Council’s structure has remained stagnant despite sweeping geopolitical changes. Proposals for reform have long been on the table, ranging from expanding permanent membership to include major powers from the Global Southsuch as India, Brazil, or Nigeriato weakening or restricting the use of veto power, which has been the main obstacle to collective decision-making (SpringerLink; Georgetown Journal of International Affairs).

Nevertheless, the road to reform is fraught with difficulty. Procedural hurdles are immense, as any amendment to the UN Charter requires the approval of two-thirds of the General Assembly along with all five permanent members of the Council. This creates a vicious cycle: the very states that hold the veto have no incentive to relinquish or limit their privileges. Consequently, large-scale structural reforms are often deemed “virtually impossible” to achieve (Carnegie Endowment, 2024; Journal of International Affairs, 2024).

Even so, more pragmatic alternatives have emerged. One such example is the “Veto Initiative,” a mechanism that grants the General Assembly the authority to hold discussions whenever a veto is exercised. While this does not formally overturn Security Council decisions, it increases transparency and strengthens moral pressure against veto users (Carnegie Endowment, 2024). Models like this suggest that reform may be more realistic if pursued incrementally through procedural adjustments rather than through sweeping, politically unattainable changes.

Thus, the provocative notion of a “seat for Kim Jong Un” should not be understood as a practical proposal, but as a symbolic lens to highlight the Security Council’s crisis of legitimacy and deficit of representation in global governance. The deeper issue is not which individual holds a permanent seat, but how to ensure that the Council truly reflects today’s international political realities. Will it remain frozen in the outdated architecture of 1945, or will it adapt to the challenges of the twenty-first century, defined by multipolarity, the rise of new powers, and non-traditional security threats such as climate change, pandemics, and cyber warfare?

The answer to this question will determine whether the UN can continue to serve as a trusted global institution, or whether it will lose legitimacy and become increasingly trapped in the shadow of its past. If meaningful reform fails, the greatest risk is not simply stagnation, but a growing shift of confidence among member states toward alternative forums outside the UNa development that could erode the multilateral order built in the aftermath of the Second World War.